groups from other nations. This bi-partisan organization is doing something more than just talking about international understanding—it is doing something about it. The problem is ever to abolish war from the face of the earth, we first must break down the barriers of mistrust and suspicion among the peoples of the world. There is no better way to accomplish this than through just such programs as this one conducted by the American Council of Young Political Leaders.

As young people will be the leaders of the world in years to come. They will be better leaders, more understanding and tolerant leaders, if they are able to expand their knowledge of other nations, other peoples, and other political systems.

This is why, Mr. Speaker, I am so pleased with the work being done by the American Council of Young Political Leaders. They have our wholehearted support in their program to further world understanding.

THE 14TH AMENDMENT—EQUAL PROTECTION LAW OR TOOL OF USURPATION

Mr. PRYOR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. RARICK] may extend remarks at this point in the Record and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, arrogantly ignoring clearcut expressions in the Constitution of the United States, the declared intent of its drafters notwithstanding, our unelected Federal judges read out prohibitions of the Constitution of the United States by adopting the fuzzy haze of the 14th amendment to legitimize their personal ideas, prejudices, theories, guilt complexes, aims, and whims.

Through the cooperation of intellectual educators, we have subjected ourself and burdened destructive use and meaning of words and phrases. We blindly accept new meanings and changed values to alter our traditional thoughts.

We have tolerated the habitual misuse of words to serve as a vehicle to abandon our foundations and goals. Thus, the present use and expansion of the 14th amendment is a sham serving to whitewash and hoodwink to precipitate a quasi-legal approach for overthrow of the tender balances and protections of limitation found in the Constitution.

But, interestingly enough, the 14th amendment—whether ratified or not—was but the expression of emotional outpouring of public sentiment following the War Between the States.

Its obvious purpose and intent was but to free human beings from ownership as a chattel by other humans. Its aim was nothing more than to free the slaves.

As our politically appointed Federal judiciary proceeds down their chosen path of chaotic departure from the peoples' government by substituting their personal law rationalized under the 14th amendment, their actions and verbiage brand them and their team as ascensionaries—those of guns—seeking to divide our Union.

They must be stopped. Public opinion must be aroused. The Union must and shall be preserved.

Mr. SPEAKER, I ask to include in the Record, following my remarks, House Concurrent Resolution 208 of the Louisiana Legislature urging this Congress to declare the 14th amendment invalid.

Also, I include in the Record an informative and well-annotated treatise on the illegality of the 14th amendment—the play toy of our secessionist judges—written presented to the President by Judge Leander H. Perez, of Louisiana.

The material referred to follows:

H. CON. RES. 208

A concurrent resolution to expose the unconstitutionality of the 14th amendment to the Congress, the United States; to interpose the sovereignty of the State of Louisiana against the execution of said amendment; to memorialize the Congress of the United States to repeal its Joint resolution of July 26, 1868, declaring that the 14th amendment had been ratified; and to provide for the distribution of certified copies of this resolution.

Whereas the purported 14th Amendment to the Constitution was never lawfully adopted in accordance with the requirements of the United States Constitution because the 13th amendment had not taken effect; and Whereas the adoption of said Resolution would in no way infringe the powers reserved to the States or to the people of the United States or the rights and privileges of the citizens of the United States, or of any State, or any class of citizens;

Resolved, That the joint resolution of the Congress of the United States, July 26, 1868, declaring that the 14th amendment has been ratified, is null and void and has no validity or force as a part of the Constitution of the United States; and Whereas the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby declared null and void for the reasons hereinafter set forth;

The 14th Amendment Is Unconstitutional

The 14th amendment to the United States Constitution is and should be held to be ineffective, invalid, null, void and unconstitutional for the following reasons:

1. The Joint Resolution proposing said Amendment was not submitted to or adopted by a Constitutional Congress. Article I, Section 3, and Article V of the U.S. Constitution.

2. The Joint Resolution was not submitted to the President for his approval. Article I, Section 7.

3. The proposed 14th Amendment was rejected by more than half of the States then in the Union; and it was never ratified by three-fourths of all the States in the Union. Article V.

The Unconstitutional Congress

The U.S. Constitution provides:

Article I, Section 3. "The Senate of the United States shall be comprised of two Senators from each State."

Article V provides: "No State, unless with its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."

The fact that 23 Senators had been unlawfully excluded from the U.S. Senate, in order to secure a two-thirds vote for adoption of the 14th Amendment is shown by Resolutions of pro-
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test adopted by the following State Legislatures:

The New Jersey Legislature by Resolution of March 27, 1868, enacted as follows:

"The said proposed amendment not having yet received the assent of the three-fourths of the necessary number of the States to withdraw its assent is undeniable."

"The vote being necessary by the constitution that every amendment to the same should be proposed by two-thirds of both houses, to the authors of said proposition, for the purpose of securing the assent of the requisite majority, determined to, and did, exclude from the said two houses eighty-four members from eleven States of the Union, upon the pretense that there were no such states in the Union; but, finding that the votes of the remainder of the said houses could not be brought to assent to the said proposition, they deliberately formed and ordered the act not to be of the Integrity of the United States senate, and without any pretense or justification, other than the possession of the power, without the right, and in palpable violation of the constitution, erected a member of their own body, representing this state, and thus practically denied to the other States the right to elect to the Senate of the United States, and thereby nominally secured the vote of two-thirds of the said houses."

1 The Georgia Legislature by Resolution of October 18, 1868, expressed as follows:

"The amendment to the Constitution proposed by this joint resolution as Article XIX in the Legislature of the State of Texas, for its action thereon, under Article V of that Constitution. This Article V, providing the mode of making amendments to that Instrument, was authorized by the States through their representatives in Congress, in proposing amendments. As representatives from nearly one-third of the States were excluded from the Congress proposing the amendments, the constitutional requisites were not complied with; it was violated in letter and in spirit; and the proposing of these amendments to States which were excluded from all participation in their Initial meeting as a State."

The Arkansas Legislature, by Resolution on December 17, 1868, protested as follows:

"The truth, as aforesaid, two-thirds of both houses of Congress to propose amendments; and, as eleven States were excluded from all participation in their Initial meeting as a State, it cannot be pretended that the said submission, the conclusion is inevitable that it is not proposed by legal authority, but in palpable violation of the Constitution."

The Georgia Legislature, by Resolution on November 9, 1868, protested as follows:

"Since the organization of the State government, Georgia has elected Senators and Representatives. So has every other State. They have been arbitrarily refused admission to their seats, not on the ground that the qualifications of the members elected did not conform to the fourth paragraph, second section, of the Constitution of the United States, but because their right of representation was denied by a portion of the States having equal representation in that body, when their votes in the Senate, and to the exclusion of the representatives of another portion, cannot be a constitutional Congress, when the representation of each State forms an integral part of the whole."

"This was not intended to be by the power in the Constitution which authorizes two-thirds of the Congress to propose amendments. We have endeavored to establish that Georgia had a right, in the first place, as a part of the Congress, to act upon the question, "Shall these amendments be presented to the Senate. Two-thirds of the whole Congress never having been States to be represented voluntarily to reduce their political power in the Union, and at the same time, disfranchise the people of the States to which they are inferior in the integrity and patriotism of eleven co-equal States."

The Florida Legislature, by Resolution of December 5, 1868, protested as follows:

"Let this alteration be made in the organic system and allow the most daring demands may or may not be required by the predominant party previous to allowing the ten States now unfaulwful and unconstitutional limitations depolitical representation in the halls so that we may see the State."

The South Carolina Legislature, by resolution of November 26, 1868, protested as follows:

"Eleven of the Southern States, including South Carolina, are deprived of their representation in Congress. Although their Senators and Representatives have been duly elected and appear to be themselves for the purpose of taking their seats, their credentials have, in most instances, been laid upon the table without being read, or have been referred to a committee, who have failed to make any report on the subject. In short, Congress has refused to exercise its Constitutional functions, and decide either upon the election, the return, or the qualifications of these selected by the States and people represented. Senators and Representatives from the Southern States were prepared to take the test oath, but even then have been persistently ignored, and kept out of the Senate to which they were entitled under the Constitution and laws.

"Hence this amendment has not been proposed by 'two-thirds of both Houses' of a legally constituted Congress, and is not, Constitutionally or legally, Art. XXI above a single Legislature for ratification."

The North Carolina Legislature, by Resolution of December 6, 1868, as follows:

"The Federal Constitution declares, in substance, that Congress shall consist of a House of Representatives, composed of members appointed by the respective States in the ratio of their population, and of a Senate, composed of two members from each State. And in the absence of any Constitutional Amendments, it is expressly provided that 'no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate.' The contemplated Amendment was not proposed to the States by a Congress thus constituted. At the time of its adoption, the States which had no representation in the Senate and House, although they all, except the State of Texas, had Senators and Representatives duly elected and claiming their privileges under the Constitution. In consequence of this, these States had no voice on the important question of proposing the Amendment. Had the Amendment been submitted to them in their votes, the proposition would doubtless have failed to command the required two-thirds majorities.

"If the votes of these States are necessary to a valid ratification of the Amendment, they were equally necessary on the question of submitting it to the States; for it would be difficult, in the opinion of the Committee, to show by what process in logic, men of intelligence could arrive at a different conclusion."

1 New Jersey Acts, March 27, 1868.

2 Article XIX, Florida, pp. 210-213.

3 Texas House Journal, 1866, p. 577.

4 Arkansas House Journal, 1866, p. 287.

5 South Carolina House Journal, 1866, p. 33 and 34.

6 Georgia House Journal, November 9, 1866, pp. 65 and 67.

7 House Journal, January 18, 1867.

8 North Carolina Senate Journal, 1866-67, pp. 93 and 94.

9 Stat. 358 etc.


12 House Journal, 1866, p. 68—Senate Journal, 1866, p. 72.


On August 20, 1866, President Andrew Johnson issued another proclamation pointing out the fact that the House of Representatives, after a full and careful investigation of the several Separatist Conventions, had adopted identical resolutions on July 22nd and July 29th, 1861, that the Civil War forced by dissolutions of the Southern States, was now waged for the purpose of conquest or to overthrow the rights and established institutions the southern states had preserved and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union with all equity and rights of the several states unimpaired, and that, in the event these purposes were accomplished, the war ought to cease. The President's proclamation on June 13, 1866, declared the insurrection in the Southern States except, Texas, no longer existed. On August 20, 1866, the President proclaimed that the insurrection in the State of Texas had been completely ended, and his proclamation continued: "the insurrection which heretofore existed in the State of Texas, and which was regarded as a part of the whole of the United States of America."

4. When the State of Louisiana rejected the 14th Amendment on February 6, 1867, making the 14th state to have rejected the same, or more than one-fourth of the total number of 36 states of the Union as of that date, thus leaving less than four-twentieths of the states possibly to ratify the same, the Amendment failed of ratification in fact and in law, and it could not have been ratified except by a new joint Resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives in accordance with Constitutional requirement.

6. Faced with the positive failure of ratification of the 14th Amendment, both Houses of Congress passed over the veto of the President, three acts, known as the Reconstruction Acts, between the dates of March 2 and July 19, 1867, especially the third of said Acts, 15 Stat. p. 14, entitled An Act to remove with "military force" the unlawfully constituted State Legislatures of the 10 Southern States of the United States, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. In President Andrew Johnson's Veto message of March 2, 1867, he pointed out these unconstitutionals: "If ever the American citizen should be left to the free exercise of his own judgment, it is when he is engaged in the work of formulating the fundamental law under which he is to live. That work is his own, and it cannot be taken out of his hand. All this legislation proceeds upon the contrary assumption that the people of each of these States shall not be able to act as such as may be arbitrarily dictated by Congress, and formed under the restraint of military rule. A plain statement of facts makes this evident."

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21 McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 94; Annual Encyclopedia, p. 452.
24 McPherson, Reconstruction, p. 94.
26 Schimmel, Assembly 1866, p. 743—Senate Journal 1866, p. 356.
27 House Journal, 39th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 569 etc.
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In these seven States, for they have abolished slavery, it also is in their State constitutions; but Kentuck y not having done so, it would still remain in that State. But, in truth, if the assumption is made that these States have illegal State governments be true, then the abolition of slavery by these illegal governments binds not the Constitution of Congress now or ever. These States the power to abolish slavery by denying to them the power to elect a legal State Legislature is a fiction and the frame a constitution for any purpose, even for such a purpose as the abolition of slavery.

As to the other constitutional amendment, that amendment to suffrage, it happens that these States have not accepted it. The consequence is, that it has never been proclaimed, even by the President, to be a part of the Constitution of the United States. The Senate of the United States has repeatedly given its sanction to the appointment of judges, district attorneys, and marshals for every one of these States; yet, if they are not legal States, not one of these judicial officers may be removed, or the acts of their predecessors be set aside or nullified.

So much for continuous legislative recognition. The instances cited, however, fall far short of showing that they might be enforcing the Constitution, as is well known, has been frequent and unavailing. The same may be said as to judicial recognition through the Supreme Court of the United States.

To me these considerations are conclusive of the unconstitutionality of this part of the bill now before me, and I earnestly commend their consideration to the members of Congress, and to the Senate. If the power of Congress, as defined by the Constitution, be a part of Congress, and to now and forever.

Within a period less than a year the legislation of Congress has attempted to strip the powers of the executive department of the government of some of its essential powers. The Constitution, and the oath provided in it, devolve upon the President the control of the Executive; and I should see that the laws are faithfully executed. The Constitution, in order to carry out this power, and in the exercise of the power that the President exercise under the Constitution, and the oath provided in it, devolve upon the President the control of the Executive; and I should see that the laws are faithfully executed. The Constitution, in order to carry out this power, and in the exercise of the power that the President exercise under the Constitution, and the oath provided in it, devolve upon the President the control of the Executive; and I should see that the laws are faithfully executed.

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The Federal Act of Congress prohibiting the entrance into the military service of the United States was before the United States Supreme Court. After the case was argued and taken under advisement, the Supreme Court, in answering the question whether the President is a part of the Constitution, will recognize no authority over the Commander-in-Chief of the army.

If there were no other objection than this to the proposed legislation, it would be sufficient.

No one can contend that the Reconstruction Acts were ever upheld as being valid and constitutional.

They were brought into question, but the Courts either avoided decision or were prevented from making any adjudication upon the constitutional law. In Mississippi v. President Andrew John son, the question was squarely presented to the Supreme Court, which held that the President could not remove the Judge and the District Attorney. The District Attorney is under the law, appointed by the President, to enforce the laws of the United States.

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Arkansas, North Carolina, Louisiana, South Carolina and Georgia.

Those Reconstruction Acts of Congress and all acts and things unlawfully done thereunder in violation of Articles I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, which required the United States to guarantee every State in the Union a republican form of government. This was declared by the Court in Georgia v. Georgia, Section I, Article I, Section 3, and Article V of the Constitution, which entailed every State in the Union to have a Republican form of government. By July 21, 1688, the Joint Resolutions of the Senate of the United States expressed doubt as to whether three-fourths of the required states had ratified the 14th Amendment, as shown by the Proclamation of July 21, 1688. Promptly on July 21, 1688, a Joint Resolution was adopted by the Senate and House of Representatives, which stated that three-fourths of the States had ratified the 14th Amendment. That resolution, however, included purported ratifications by the unlawful puppet legislatures of 5 States, Arkansas, North Carolina, Louisiana, South Carolina and Alabama, which had previously been declared null and void by the 14th Amendment. The Senate declared that they were unlawful and constituted legislatures, as above shown. The Joint Resolution assumed that the function of the Senate of the United States in which Congress, by Act of April 20, 1818, had vested the function of issuing such proclamations declaring the ratification of the 14th Amendment. The Secretary of State bowed to the action of Congress and issued his Proclamation of July 21, 1688, in which he stated that he was acting under authority of the Act of April 20, 1818, but pursuant to said Resolution of July 21, 1688. He listed the 37 States of those 37 States as having ratified the 14th Amendment, including the purported ratification of the unlawful puppet Legislature of Alabama. It is true that the Proclamation recognized the fact that the Legislatures of said states, several months preceding then, had declared their ratification of the Amendment and effectively rejected the 14th Amendment in January, 1868, and April, 1868. The Secretary of State declared that these three states from the purported ratifications of the 14th Amendment, only 23 State ratifications at most could be claimed; whereas the ratification of 28 States, or three-fourths of 37 States in the Union, were required to ratify the 14th Amendment.

From all of the above documented historic facts, it is inescapable that the 14th Amendment never was validly adopted as an article of the Constitution, that it has no legal effect, and has never been declared by the Courts to be unconstitutional, and therefore null, void and of no effect.

THE CONSTITUTION STIFFES THE 14TH AMENDMENT WITH NULLITY

The defenders of the 14th Amendment contend that the U.S. Supreme Court has finally decided upon its validity. Such is not the case.

In what is considered the leading case, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 448, 59 S. Ct. 972, the Supreme Court did not uphold the validity of the 14th Amendment.

In that case, the Court brushed aside constitutional questions as though they did not exist. For instance, the Court made the statement that: "The legislatures of Georgia, North Carolina and South Carolina had rejected the amendment in November and December, 1866. New governments were erected in those States by the direction of Congress. The new legislatures ratified the amendment, that of North Carolina on July 4, 1688, and South Carolina on July 9, 1688, and that of Georgia on July 21, 1688." And the Court gave no consideration to the fact that Georgia, North Carolina and South Carolina were three of the original states of the Union with valid and existing constitutions on an equal footing with the other original states and those later admitted into the Union.

What constitutional right did Congress have to remove those state governments and their legislatures under unlawful military government power over the states?"13 which had for their purpose, the destruction and removal of federal state governments and the nullification of their Constitution and laws?

The fact that these three states and seven other Southern States had existing Constitutions, as well as the Union, again and again; had been divided into judicial districts for holding their district and circuit courts; had been called upon by Congress to act through their legislatures upon two Amendments, the 13th and 14th, and by their ratifications had actually made possible the adoption of the 13th Amendment; as well as their state governments having been re-established under pre-Confederate laws by a President and President Andrew Johnson's Veto message and proclamations, were all brushed aside by the Court in Coleman by the statement: "No Amendment was erected in those States (and in others) under the direction of Congress," and that these new legislatures ratified the Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court overlooked that it previously had held that at no time were those Southern States out of the Union. White v. Hart, 1871, 33 Wall. 464, 464.

In Coleman, the Court did not adjudicate upon the invalidity of the Acts of Congress which set aside those state Constitutions and abolished their state legislatures,—the Court simply referred to the fact that their legality constituted the 14th Amendment and that the "new legislatures" had ratified the Amendment.

The Court ignored the fact, too, that the State of Virginia was also one of the original states with its Constitution and Legislature in full operation under its civil government at the time.

The Court also ignored the fact that the other six Southern States, which were given the same treatment by Congress under the unconstitutional "Reconstruction Acts," all had legal constitutions and a republican form of government, as was recognized by Congress by its admission of those states into the Union. The Court certainly must take judicial cognizance of the fact that Congress has admitted its permitting by Congress into the Union, Congress enacts an Enabling Act to enable the inhabitants of the territories to set up a republican form of government as a condition precedent to the admittance of the territory into the Union, that the Congress has approved of such Constitution, Congress then passes the Act of Admission of such state.

All this was ignored and brushed aside by the Supreme Court in the Coleman case. However, in Coleman the Court inadvertently said this:

"Whenever official notice is received at the Department of State that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the United States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Constitution, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause the amendment to be published, with his certificate, in the several newspapers of the States wherein the amendment may have been adopted, and that the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United States."14

In Hawke v. Smith, 1920, 253 U.S. 221, 40 S. Ct. 227, the U.S. Supreme Court unmistakably held that:

"The fifth article is a grant of authority by the people to Congress. The determination of the method of the exercise of a national power specifically granted by the Constitution; that power is conferred upon Congress, and is limited to two methods, by action of the Legislatures of three-fourths of the states, or conventions in a like number of states. Dodge v. Conkling, 1875, 8 Wall. 442, 19 L. Ed. 97, 98. The framers of the Constitution might have adopted a different method. Ratification might have been left to a vote of the people, or to some authority of government other than that selected. The language of the article is plain, and admits of no doubt in its meaning. It is as follows: The ratification of the legislatures of courts or legislative bodies, national or state, to alter the method which the Constitution has prescribed."

We submit that in none of the cases, in which the Court avoided the constitutional question involved in the composition of the Congress, which adopted the 14th Amendment, did the Court pass upon the constitutionality of the Congress which adopted the 14th Amendment. Instead, the Court in Coleman and in the Joint Resolution passed on the constitutionality of the Congress which adopted the 14th Amendment, with 88 Representatives and 23 Senators, in effect, favorably taking or refusing to take or deny their seats and their votes on the Joint Resolution proposing the Amendment. In order to pass the same by a two-thirds vote, as pointed out in the New Jersey Legislature Resolution on March 27, 1868.

The constitutional requirements set forth in Article V of the Constitution permit the Congress to propose amendments only whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary—that is, two-thirds of both houses as then constituted without forcible elections.

Such a fragmentary Congress also violated the constitutional requirements of Article V that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. If there was no such thing as a proposed amendment illegally proposed or never legally ratified by three-fourths of the states.

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method required by Article V. Anything beyond that which a court is called upon to hold in order to validate an amendment, would be equivalent to writing into Article V another substantive provision which has never been authorized by the people of the United States.

On this point, therefore, the question is, was the 14th Amendment proposed and ratified in accordance with Article V?

In answering this question, it is of no real moment that no valid amendments have been rendered in which the parties did not contest or submit proper evidence, or the Court assumed that the propositions of Article V were not complied with the provisions of Article V. It would be inconceivable that the Congress of the United States could propose, or Congress could vote for the life of the Court, to an invalid amendment by resolving that its effort had succeeded—regardless of compliance with the positive provisions of Article V.

It should need no further citations to support the proposition that neither the Joint Resolution proposing the 14th Amendment nor its ratification by the required three-fourths of the States in the Union were in compliance with the requirements of Article V of the Constitution.

When the mandatory provisions of the Constitution are not complied with, the Constitution itself strikes with nullity the Act that did violence to its provisions. Thus, the Constitution strikes with nullity the purported 14th Amendment.

The Courts, bound by oath to support the Constitution, should review all of the evidence herein submitted and measure the facts proving violations of the mandatory provisions of the Constitution with Article V, and finally render judgment declaring said purported Amendment never to have been adopted as required by the Constitution.

The Constitution makes it the sworn duty of the judges to uphold the Constitution which strikes with nullity the 14th Amendment.

And, as Chief Justice Marshall pointed out for a unanimous Court in Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch 179):

"...the framers of the constitution contemplated the instrument as a rule of the government of courts, as well as of the legislature."

"Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government?"

"If such be the real state of things, that is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime."

"Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to the every constitution of courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument."

The federal judiciary refuse to hear argument on the invalidity of the 14th Amendment, even when the issue is presented squarely by the pleadings and the evidence above.

Only an aroused public sentiment in favor of preserving the Constitution and our institutions and freedoms under constitutional government, and the future security of our country, will break the political barrier which now prevents judicial consideration of the unconstitutionality of the 14th amendment.

THE MID-EAST CRISIS—NOT BACKWARD TO BELLIGERENCY BUT FORWARD TO PEACE

Mr. PRYOR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Mitchell, may extend his remarks at this point in the Record and include extraneous matter.

THE SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arizona?

There was no objection.

Mr. TENZER. Mr. Speaker, the distinguished Foreign Minister of the State of Israel, Abba Eban, in his address to the United Nations Security Council, on June 6, 1967, set the theme for a lasting peace in the Middle East so much desired by all the peace-loving nations of the world. His address was entitled, "No Retreat to Belligerency but Forward to Peace."

On June 7, 1967, following the first United Nations resolution calling for a cease-fire in the Middle East, I stated to a delegation of American Jews who visited me in Washington as follows:

I deem it most imperative that the terms of the agreement to follow the cease fire provide effective guarantees, to the end that permanent peace may be established in the Middle East.

The interests of world peace would best be served if the terms provide:

1. For recognition of the validity of the sovereignty of the State of Israel by the U.A.R. and other Arab states.

2. A reaffirmation that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway and will remain open for free passage to shipping of all nations through the Straits of Tiran.

3. An opening of the Suez Canal to shipping of all nations.

With the ending of terrorism and border raids so that Israel may carry out its desire to live in peace with its neighbors.

5. For direct negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors for the resolution of other pending issues.

Indeed, it is within the province of the sovereign State of Israel to speak its mind on the terms of the agreement to follow the cease-fire—the terms which in its judgment will best assure permanent peace in the Middle East. We on the other hand take the opportunity to make suggestions which in our opinion will best secure the peace of the world—thereby also serving the best interests of the United States.

An elaboration of the five points suggested on June 7, 1966, is accordingly ordered.

I. THE STATE OF ISRAEL A SOVEREIGN NATION

The State of Israel is a member of the United Nations—a full-fledged member of the family of nations. Though the integrity of her borders were guaranteed by the major powers—three times in 20 years the State of Israel was obliged to go to war to put a stop to the violation of her boundary lines.

It is therefore basic to any plan for permanent peace in the Middle East that the sovereignty of the State of Israel be recognized by her neighbors. This fact cannot be questioned—this truth is and should not be negotiable because its import was underlined by the events of the past three days.

The foundation for a permanent peace in the Middle East must be the absolute and unqualified recognition by the Arab States of the right of the State of Israel to exist as a sovereign state among other sovereign states. When this foundation is laid, then Israel and her Arab neighbors can, through direct negotiations, begin to build the structure leading to permanent peace.

II. STRAIT OF TIRAN AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY

Since 1950, Egypt has repeatedly given assurances that the Strait of Tiran would remain open for "innocent passage